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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following rules are determinative in this appeal:
U.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues, for any of the following causes; . .
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence
to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against
law.
U.R.C.P. Rule 50

Motion for Directed Verdict and for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict

(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed
verdict made at the close of all the evidence
is denied or for any reason is not granted,
the court is deemed to have submitted the
action to the jury subject to a later
determination of the legal questions raised
by the motion. Not later than ten days after
entry of judgment, a party who has moved for
a directed verdict may move to have the
verdict and any judgment entered thereon set
aside and to have judgment entered in
accordance with his motion for a directed
verdict; or if a verdict was not returned
such party, within ten days after the jury
has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with his motion for directed
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be
joined with this motion, or a new trial may
be prayed for in the alternative. If a
verdict was returned the court may allow the
judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment
and either order a new trial or direct the
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict
had been directed. If no verdict was
returned the court may direct the entry of
judgment as if the requested verdict had been
directed or may order a new trial.
iv

ARGUMENT
I. A Review of the Sufficiency of the Evidence on Appeal is Not
Precluded bv Plaintiffs Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict
Purina Trial,
Defendant argues in his brief that the plaintiff has no
standing to question the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in
light of his failure to move for a directed verdict during trial.
In support of this proposition the defendant cites two cases,
Henderson v. Meyer. 533 P.2d 290, 291 (Utah 1975), and Pollesche
v, Transamerican Insurance Company. 27 U.2d 430, 497 P.2d 236
(1972).

Both Pollesche and Henderson involved rear end accidents

with facts very similar to those at issue in the present case.
In Pollesche the jury had returned a verdict for no cause of
action against the plaintiffs.

The Court found that evidence as

to liability in the accident was disputed and that a reasonable
jury could make the determination that there was negligence on
the part of the plaintiff.

In the course of its decision the

Court stated in a footnote:
Plaintiff, Marie Pollesche, argues that she
should have received a directed verdict
against the defendant on the issue of
liability because the verdict and judgment
are not sustained by the evidence. The
record does not reveal any motion by counsel
for plaintiff for a directed verdict. The
failure of a party to make a motion for a
directed verdict not only forecloses the
trial court from consideration of a motion
for judgment not withstanding the verdict,
but such failure in addition precludes the
appellate court from reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
verdict. Rule 50(b), U.R.C.P.; Brigham v.
Moon Lake Electric Assoc.f 24 U.2d 292, 296,
470 P.2d 393 (1970). Consequently plaintiff
may not allege error on the part of the trial

court in its denial of the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Company. 27 U.2d at
433. fn.l. Henderson, supra, likewise dealt with a plaintiff who
had brought a claim against a defendant who had injured a
plaintiff in a rear end collision.

As in Pollesche. the jury

entered a verdict in favor of the defendant.

However, on appeal,

the Supreme Court parted ways with the Pollesche court in
reversing the trial court's judgment on the basis that under the
facts of Henderson there was no ability for reasonable minds to
disagree as to the fact that the defendant was negligent.

It is

in this context that the Henderson court stated:
The law is to the effect that one who does
not move for a directed verdict generally has
no standing to urge on appeal that the
evidence does not support the judgment. . * .
However, an exception exists where plain
error appears in the record and it would
result in a miscarriage of justice to affirm
the judgment (citations omitted).
Henderson, supra at 291-92.
As for the Court statement in Pollesche. the plaintiff has
no argument with the proposition that a party who fails to make a
motion for directed verdict in trial is not in a position to ask
for a judgment not withstanding the verdict after a jury has made
its decision.
stateso

This is all footnote 1 in the Pollesche case

To read the Pollesche footnote as broadly as the

defendant would like, however, would fly in its face of the
language in the decision following the footnote.

Immediately

following footnote 1 Pollesche discusses at length the standard
-2-

used in reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of a Motion for
New Trial on the basis of insufficiency of evidence.

It is clear

from Pollesche itself that while a review of a denial of a motion
for judgment not withstanding the verdict on the basis of
insufficiency of the evidence is precluded by a failure to make a
motion for directed verdict in trial, the same is not true for
reviewing a motion for new trial that has been denied by the
trial court.

Henderson does not discuss this distinction at all

in its decision.

The most recent reference to the concept that

failure to move for directed verdict precludes a later review of
evidentiary sufficiency appears in Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14
(Utah 1988), where the Court, once again in a footnote, cites
Pollesche for the proposition that, "ordinarily, the failure to
make a motion for a directed verdict forecloses consideration of
a later motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and any
appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict.

Supra, at 15, fn.l.

Rule 59 contemplates that there is the ability of a party
after trial to make a separate legal challenge to the evidentiary
sufficiency of a jury's verdict in addition to the procedures
outlined in Rule 50 for motion for directed verdict and motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

However, no Utah case

discusses at length the relationship between Rule 50 ("Motion for
Directed Verdict and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict)
and Rule 59 ("new trials; amendments of judgment").
The best discussion of these issues appears in Brigham v.
-3-

Moon Lake Electric Associationf

24 U.2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 (Utah

1970), cited in footnote 1 of Pollesche.

Moon Lake suggests that

where a motion for directed verdict has been made in the trial, a
challenge to the evidentiary sufficiency of a jury's verdict may
be made immediately after the verdict is presented by means of a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or,

within the time

constraints set forth under Rule 59 by way of a motion for new
trial.

Moon Lake suggests that failure to make a motion for

directed verdict in the trial itself does not preclude the option
for a party to make a motion for new trial alleging that the
verdict must be set aside based upon insufficiency of the
evidence.
The court should take this opportunity to clarify the
Pollesche footnote, the language in Henderson v. Mever, and the
Hansen v. Stewart footnote and distinguish between the procedures
and remedies in Rule 50 and Rule 59.

Given the defendant's

argument, it is important to have an express statement that the
failure to move for directed verdict does not preclude the
possibility of challenging the legal sufficiency of a verdict
through the means of a motion for new trial.
II.

There is no Evidence Whatsoever to Support the Jury's
Verdict that the Defendant was that Negligent.

In his brief defendant makes no attempt to justify or excuse
his actions other than to say that Ma reasonably prudent person
cannot look everywhere at once."

Appellees brief, p.3. While it

is true that the burden of proving negligence rests with the
plaintiff, the facts clearly show that this accident was caused
-4-
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